If you are new to the Equibit story, please read The Assassination of Equibit, originally released in 2023.

When the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989, the world celebrated the end of one of history’s most oppressive regimes. East Germans stormed the headquarters of the Ministry for State Security — the infamous Stasi — desperate to seize and protect the mountains of files that documented decades of tyranny. What they uncovered was more horrifying than most could have imagined.

Among the archives was Directive 1/76, issued in 1976 by Stasi chief Erich Mielke. This document formalized Zersetzung — “decomposition” or “corrosion” — a systematic program of psychological warfare designed to destroy “hostile-negative” individuals and groups without the messiness of arrests, trials, or overt violence. The goal was simple and demonic: fragment, paralyze, disorganize, and isolate the target so completely that they could no longer function as a threat — all while maintaining the appearance of normal life.

The Sheer Evil of Zersetzung

Historian Hubertus Knabe, one of the foremost experts on the Stasi, described it chillingly: “The Stasi didn’t try to arrest every dissident. It preferred to paralyze them… by damaging their reputation, by organizing failures in their work, and by destroying their personal relationships.”

Tactics included:

• Covert home invasions to move furniture, change alarm clocks, or swap everyday items (classic gaslighting)
• Systematic smear campaigns using true, false, and twisted information
• Engineered professional and social failures
• Provocation, anonymous threats, and orchestrated “coincidences”
• Destruction of marriages, friendships, and family ties through rumors and planted evidence
• Sabotage of careers, vehicles, and medical care

Victims often had no idea the Stasi was responsible. Many believed they were losing their minds. Mental breakdowns and suicides were common outcomes.

One victim, Jürgen Fuchs, a writer and dissident, called it “psychosocial crime” and “an assault on the human soul.” Many survivors suffered lifelong trauma, paranoia, depression, and shattered trust. Some received modest compensation decades later, but for most, the damage was irreparable. Families were torn apart. Careers evaporated. Lives were slowly, methodically erased from within.

The Stasi built an enormous network of civilian informants — the Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (IMs). By 1989, there were roughly 91,000 full-time Stasi employees and between 173,000 and 189,000 unofficial informants. This meant roughly one in every 50 to 60 East German citizens was actively collaborating with the secret police — an astonishing level of societal penetration. Some estimates, including occasional informants, run as high as one in six or seven adults.

These informants came from every walk of life: neighbors, colleagues, friends, even family members. Recruitment methods ranged from ideological appeal and bribes to blackmail and threats against loved ones. Once enlisted, they were used to spread rumors, provoke conflicts, sabotage opportunities, and report intimate details for the creation of detailed “psychograms” — psychological profiles used to exploit every weakness.

From East Germany to Canada: The Equibit Case

What happened to Chris Horlacher and Equibit Group bears unmistakable hallmarks of this same strategy — updated with 21st-century digital tools and operating within a Five Eyes democracy.

As documented across the Equibit Factum, technical forensic reports, live videos, court filings, and interviews on equibitlawsuit.com, the campaign against Horlacher and his company included:

• Prolonged surveillance and contact by prime-suspect Marc Godard beginning as early as 2010 — when Chris was engaged in online liberty activism.
• What appears to be the recruitment and corruption of Sergei Sachkov, lead Core developer at Equibit Group, by CSIS.
• Intense and malicious harassment by the Ontario Securities Commission, and demonstrable entrapment efforts.
• Marc’s attempts to involve Chris with questionable individuals post-Equibit, more entrapment schemes via financial crimes.
• Router compromises via the TR-069 protocol, with logs showing impossible 1981 timestamps and persistent remote access.
• DNS man-in-the-middle attacks rerouting traffic through U.S. servers.
• Microsoft ecosystem intrusions where private memos were observed copying themselves in real time.
• De-banking, institutional pressure, and coordinated defamation campaigns.
• Insider betrayal, code forking, rebranding (OCEAN → Tesseract), a coordinated effort to dismantle Equibit Group from within.

Marc Godard’s background in Cognitive Science would have been particularly useful in constructing the kind of detailed psychograms the Stasi relied upon — mapping personality weaknesses, relationships, and pressure points for maximum psychological effect.

This was not random crime or bad luck. It was a sustained, multi-vector operation designed to isolate, financially ruin, discredit, and psychologically break a founder who dared to become a fierce advocate for limited, constitutional government.

Zersetzung Has Gone Global

The Stasi needed a vast human network because they lacked today’s digital omnipresence. In the Five Eyes countries (Canada, USA, UK, Australia, New Zealand), agencies no longer need millions of informants on the ground. They have tools that allow remote, deniable, scalable decomposition: compromised routers, operating system-level access, financial system cooperation, and institutional capture.

What Horlacher has experienced — and meticulously documented — strongly suggests that modern Zersetzung is not only possible in Canada and its allies, but is likely already being deployed against innovators, dissidents, and threats to the established order throughout the country.

A Call to Global Conscience

This is cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. It is extrajudicial psychological torture dressed up in the language of national security. It violates every principle of human dignity and the rule of law.

We call on readers to take immediate action:

1. Visit https://equibitlawsuit.com — read the evidence, watch the videos, review the technical reports.
2. Submit a detailed complaint to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture (sr-torture@ohchr.org), including all available documentation and requesting an urgent inquiry into the use of modern Zersetzung-style tactics by intelligence agencies in democratic nations.
3. Contact appropriate NGOs and oversight bodies:  Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Privacy International, and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.
4. Share this story relentlessly. Public awareness is the greatest threat to these shadow operations.

What was done to Equibit and Chris Horlacher must not be allowed to become the new normal. If governments in the West can wage silent war on their own citizens — innovators, thinkers, builders — using the refined cruelty of the Stasi, then none of us are safe.

The Berlin Wall fell. The files were opened. The world saw the evil and recoiled in horror.

Today, new walls are being built in the digital realm — invisible, pervasive, and far more sophisticated. We must tear them down with the same courage and determination.

The time for silence is over. The time for exposure, outrage, and accountability is now.

Demand an international inquiry. Demand justice for the victims of digital Zersetzung. Demand that this hideous violation of human rights ends.

Because if we do not act, the decomposition will spread — until freedom itself is nothing but a memory.

Stay tuned to equibitlawsuit.com for more updates on the Equibit lawsuits against CSIS and related actors

If you are new to the Equibit story, please read The Assassination of Equibit, originally released in 2023.

A recurring and particularly damaging element in the campaign against Equibit Group founder Chris Horlacher has been the repeated disruption of his access to banking and payment systems — commonly referred to as de-banking. These incidents have not only created severe operational challenges but also appear designed to isolate him financially while he pursues justice in the Canadian courts.

Major Incidents of Financial Interference

Revolut / Lead Bank (2025–2026)

Chris maintained two U.S. business accounts with the fintech platform Revolut. After months of normal activity, both accounts were frozen without any notice being provided to Chris. One suspension occurred shortly after Revolut had upgraded the account to a custom “Enterprise” plan based on the company’s foreign exchange volumes. Despite multiple support inquiries, Revolut provided almost no meaningful explanation, citing only a vague “security review.” Both accounts were ultimately terminated with no right of appeal, causing significant disruption to business operations.

TD Canada Trust – The Norm Bailey Case

In early 2026 Norm Bailey, a hopeful member of one of Chris’s clients, attempted to send a legitimate payment for a membership fee. TD Bank blocked the transaction and subjected Norm to aggressive interrogation by a senior representative who only identified himself as “Phil.” Norm later described the ordeal in an email to Chris, whom he had recently met at the Anarchapulco 2026 conference:

“Subsequently, three days later we were contacted by a mystery figure in the TD organization who only identified himself by his first name… He proceeded to drill us on what the wire transfer was for… After a lengthy question period and listening to his repeated accusations that we were taking part in a scam he suddenly said he was closing all my accounts at TD… We were in serious shock. Ive been with them for 65 years… We were both very close to having a heart attack.”

Under extreme duress, Norm and his wife were pressured into admitting the payment might be related to a “scam” and promising never to do business with the Horlacher-linked entity again. Only then were their accounts restored. Norm explicitly stated that “our lives were in danger due to the stress we were under.”

CIBC – Suspicious Inquiries

Chris has received multiple calls from individuals expressing interest in his client’s services but who refused to provide their full names or the name of their employer. One such call originated from the CIBC toll-free number 1-866-639-5014, which was recorded by Chris. These interactions appeared structured to entice Chris into performing regulated money transmitter activities without proper licensing — a potential entrapment scenario.

Broader Pattern

These events are not isolated. They form part of a sustained pattern of financial and institutional pressure that has intensified around key milestones in the Equibit lawsuits. Clients and business associates have reported unusual scrutiny whenever Horlacher’s name or associated entities are involved. Traditional banking relationships have become unreliable, forcing Chris to operate with reduced access to essential financial infrastructure.

This type of economic isolation is a hallmark of Zersetzung — the Stasi’s strategy of quietly undermining a target’s ability to function normally so that their struggles appear self-inflicted.

Why This Is So Concerning

Access to banking and payment systems is fundamental in a modern economy. When financial institutions appear to act in coordination — or at minimum show unusual responsiveness — to pressure someone engaged in litigation against intelligence agencies, it raises profound questions about:

• The independence of Canada’s financial sector
• Potential weaponization of “risk management” and “compliance” processes as tools of retaliation
• The practical ability of citizens to challenge powerful state actors without facing extralegal consequences

Chris has been personally out-of-pocket hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal costs while simultaneously fighting to maintain basic financial functionality.

Further Reading & Evidence:

• Router Sabotage via TR-069 Protocol
• DNS Man-in-the-Middle Attack
• Microsoft Unauthorized Access Incidents
• NASA HPCC Honeypot Probe

The combination of technical surveillance, financial de-banking, and institutional obstacles paints a disturbing picture of alleged multi-domain harassment.

If you believe financial institutions should remain neutral and that litigants deserve protection from economic retaliation, please share this post and help bring greater awareness to these issues.

Stay tuned to equibitlawsuit.com for more updates on the Equibit lawsuits against CSIS and related actors.

If you are new to the Equibit story, please read The Assassination of Equibit, originally released in 2023.

By December 2020 CSIS was deep in default of filing its defense, and Chris Horlacher suspected they would attempt to undermine the lawsuits via other means. After experiencing persistent and strange internet behaviors Horlacher deployed a honeypot named “Equibit-Dev” on his home network while still residing in Canada on a Rogers internet connection. The purpose was straightforward: to observe and document any targeted probing of his systems.

What followed was a series of events that remain among the most technically and behaviorally revealing in the Equibit case.

Chronology of Events

December 2020 – Initial Probe

Shortly after the honeypot was activated, it received an immediate probe from the link-local IP address 169.254.15.240. This address returned several times over the ensuing weeks and eventually self-identified on the local network as “Equibit-Dev.local” — using the exact naming convention of Horlacher’s honeypot.

Link-local addresses (169.254.0.0/16 range) are not publicly routable and are typically used for automatic communication within a local network segment. In this context, the appearance of such a probe strongly suggests activity originating from within the local network — most plausibly the router itself, which Chris already suspected had been subjected to ISP-level interception under a Federal Court warrant.

Controlled Disclosure

Horlacher performed a controlled disclosure, informing Marc Godard (long-time friend, former CTO and CEO of Equibit Group, and primary suspect for being a CSIS Officer) and IT-security professional George Plytas (a highly-accomplished CISO whom Chris had worked with at several companies) about the probe. For the purpose of the test, he referred to it as the “NASA” probe (the actual address was one digit off from a known NASA range, 169.154.15.240).

Marc Godard quickly downplayed the finding. George Plytas, a seasoned cybersecurity expert with whom Horlacher had a long professional relationship, immediately ceased all communication and has not been heard from since.

January 3, 2021 & May 30, 2021 – Confirmed Government-Linked Probes

Several weeks after the initial link-local probe, the honeypot was contacted by the IP address 168.254.7.38. This address belongs to ASN BHN-33363, officially registered to Charter Communications, Inc. (formerly Bright House Networks). Charter is one of the largest cable and internet service providers in the United States, operating under the Spectrum brand in many regions.

Sources:

• ARIN WHOIS Record for AS33363
• BGP.tools ASN Details

While Charter Communications is a commercial ISP, large U.S. telecommunications providers like Charter are frequently used by government agencies for data interception, handoffs, and operational cover. IP ranges from major carriers are commonly seen in government and law enforcement activity due to warrants served on the ISP.

The 168.254.7.38 address probed the honeypot once on January 3, 2021, and then three separate times on May 30, 2021. The repetition on May 30 is particularly noteworthy, as it suggests deliberate, targeted reconnaissance rather than random scanning.

Analysis and Implications

The combination of these probes is significant:

• The link-local probe (169.254.15.240) suggests local network compromise or router-level monitoring, consistent with lawful interception authorized by a Federal Court warrant served on Rogers.
• The BHN-33363 probes represent external interest from a major U.S. telecommunications ASN with documented government ties. The timing of these probes — shortly after honeypot deployment and again during sensitive litigation periods — strengthens the pattern of coordinated surveillance.

Together, they indicate targeted technical surveillance during a period when Horlacher was actively preparing to confront CSIS in discovery.

The behavioral reactions remain particularly telling. Marc Godard’s rapid dismissal and George Plytas’s complete withdrawal of contact occurred immediately after disclosure. In intelligence and counter-intelligence contexts, such abrupt changes in behavior are often interpreted as signs of recognition or operational sensitivity.

Conclusion

While the most dramatic initial probe was link-local rather than a direct external NASA connection, the overall pattern — local router-level activity combined with probes from a major government-linked ASN, timed with litigation milestones, and followed by highly suspicious reactions from key individuals — remains deeply concerning.

This incident forms part of a broader technical surveillance picture that has been meticulously documented and will be included in the full Factum of Equibit Group.

The watchers were active.

Some of their reactions suggested they did not appreciate being watched in return.

Stay tuned to equibitlawsuit.com for more updates on the Equibit lawsuits against CSIS and related actors.

If you are new to the Equibit story, please read The Assassination of Equibit, originally released in 2023.

In one of the clearest examples of technical surveillance in his case, Chris Horlacher discovered and documented a DNS-based Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack that was intercepting and potentially monitoring his internet traffic.

Discovery of the DNS Hijack

While investigating persistent connectivity problems and router compromises in 2025, Chris noticed that DNS queries were resolving through unexpected Akamai servers located in the United States, even when he manually configured trusted public resolvers such as Cloudflare (1.1.1.1).

He engaged an independent, experienced cybersecurity professional to conduct a thorough forensic investigation. The expert worked directly with Chris as he performed extensive testing across multiple devices, configurations, and networks. The results confirmed anomalous DNS behavior consistent with interception or manipulation, primarily affecting the home Telmex network.

Controlled Disclosure Test

At the time the DNS MITM was still active, Chris made a deliberate controlled disclosure. He shared specific details about discovering and isolating the attack with only one person — Ilya Fadeev, a minor shareholder and former lead wallet developer at Equibit Group — who was known to be in communication with Marc Godard, a co-founder, former CTO, and lead suspect in Chris’s investigation of the sabotage and entrapment efforts that had been levelled against him.

Within hours of this limited disclosure, the most obvious signs of the DNS manipulation disappeared. Follow-up testing confirmed that DNS queries were now resolving normally through trusted servers.

Expert Analysis and Evidence

The cybersecurity specialist produced a detailed report documenting the investigation, test methodology, and findings. This report included extensive DNS leak tests, nslookup results, and comparative analysis across networks.

Download: Expert Report (August 18, 2025)

Screenshots of the DNS tracing tests are available upon request to competent researchers or journalists.

Notably, this was the same expert report that Chris later witnessed being spontaneously moved to his desktop through apparent remote access via his Microsoft OneDrive account.

Strategic Context: “Control the Battlefield”

Had Chris remained in Canada, such a MITM attack might have been unnecessary. Canadian authorities could simply serve a warrant directly to the ISP for full traffic access. By relocating to Mexico, Chris deliberately removed one of the most powerful tools from his adversaries’ arsenal — forcing them to resort to more complex technical attacks like router compromises via TR-069 and DNS manipulation.

This forms part of Chris’s broader “Control the Battlefield” strategy, which comes from Sun Tzu’s Art of War: denying easy institutional access and forcing any surveillance into more detectable, and legally questionable methods.

Implications

A DNS Man-in-the-Middle attack at the router or ISP level is extremely invasive. It enables:

• Logging of every website visited
• Undetectable traffic redirection to spoofed websites
• Monitoring of communications (even HTTPS to a limited degree)

The precision, persistence, and rapid response to the controlled disclosure strongly suggest a targeted operation by sophisticated actors.

This incident adds to the growing body of technical evidence of digital harassment that includes router compromises, Microsoft ecosystem intrusions, and other documented attacks.

Further Reading:

• Router Sabotage via TR-069
• Microsoft Unauthorized Access Incidents
• Complete Media section

These attacks highlight the vulnerabilities of modern connected infrastructure and the challenges faced by individuals seeking accountability from powerful institutions.

If you value digital privacy and the right to due process, please share this post.

Stay tuned to equibitlawsuit.com for more updates on the Equibit lawsuits against CSIS and related actors.

If you are new to the Equibit story, please read The Assassination of Equibit, originally released in 2023.

Chris Horlacher has documented multiple sophisticated intrusions through his Microsoft ecosystem. These incidents go well beyond ordinary malware and align with key moments in his legal activities. They indicate a close collaboration between Microsoft and the Five Eyes to deliver undetectable spyware onto targeted devices in order to steal information and interfere with the normal functions of the computer.

Key Incidents of Unauthorized Access

• July 19, 2025 – Unauthorized Sharing of Sensitive Memo
  A confidential memo was suddenly made publicly shareable via OneDrive using Chris’s own Microsoft account. He did not perform this action. During the event, his computer’s built-in screen recorder was disabled. Luckily Chris was able to capture the event with his cell phone’s camera.

Watch the incident:

• August 27, 2025 – Spontaneous File Movement
  A critical security report analyzing router compromises was mysteriously moved to the desktop.
• October 27, 2025 – Camera Roll Breach
  OneDrive logs showed someone browsing the Camera Roll folder containing images taken directly by the device, as well as two files related to psychology that provide insight as to the hacker’s identity (more on that in later posts!)

Watch the Camera Roll intrusion:

Mass Windows & BIOS Updates – Highly Suspicious Timing

On August 18, 2025, immediately before a strategy call with his lawyers about upcoming discovery sessions, Chris’s computer began installing an unusually large wave of updates — including Windows, BIOS, and more than a dozen other components. He described it as one of the largest simultaneous update pushes he had ever experienced. Call quality then rapidly deteriorated and the connection was terminated exactly when the discussion turned to sensitive topics.

This event is especially concerning in the context of Bill C-22, Canada’s proposed Lawful Access Act. Part 2 of the bill would require electronic service providers (including software and operating system vendors) to build and maintain technical capabilities to facilitate authorized access to information by law enforcement and CSIS. Critics argue this could effectively compel companies like Microsoft to enable mechanisms for delivering signed updates or payloads that Windows would trust by default. Because Microsoft-signed updates are automatically trusted by the operating system, they represent a powerful and nearly undetectable vector for delivering targeted tools to specific users.

For more on Bill C-22:

• Department of Justice Backgrounder
• Michael Geist Analysis

Nightmare Eclipse Zero-Days and Browsergate

These incidents occurred against the backdrop of major Microsoft security controversies. In 2026, researcher Nightmare-Eclipse (also known as Chaotic Eclipse) publicly released several high-impact Windows zero-days, including exploits targeting Windows Defender and privilege escalation mechanisms. Some researchers have speculated that certain vulnerabilities may have been known internally for extended periods before public disclosure.

Additionally, Browsergate exposed serious allegations against LinkedIn (owned by Microsoft). According to a detailed report by Fairlinked e.V.:

• LinkedIn allegedly injected JavaScript that scanned users’ browsers for over 6,000 Chrome extensions.
• The script reportedly collected detailed device telemetry and extension data without clear user consent or prominent disclosure in the privacy policy.
• This allowed LinkedIn to build extensive user profiles, potentially identifying competitors, corporate tools, and other sensitive software.

The revelations led to privacy lawsuits and widespread criticism. You can read the original report here: BrowserGate.eu

Broader Implications

These events demonstrate deep access into Chris’s systems, precise timing aligned with legal activities, and the ability to manipulate core operating system functions. When combined with other documented technical attacks, they highlight growing risks around proprietary platforms and the potential for state-level exploitation.

Further Reading & Updates:

• Additional technical evidence and interviews in the Media section
• Ongoing lawsuit developments at equibitlawsuit.com

This case raises important questions about digital privacy, corporate responsibilities, and the balance between security and individual rights. Share this post if you believe these issues deserve greater public scrutiny.

Stay tuned to equibitlawsuit.com for more updates on the Equibit lawsuits against CSIS and related actors.

If you are new to the Equibit story, please read The Assassination of Equibit, originally released in 2023.

In the ongoing campaign of digital harassment and sabotage documented by Chris Horlacher, one of the most technical and intrusive episodes involves repeated compromises of his home routers in Mexico. These incidents directly affected Chris Horlacher’s ability to work, communicate securely, and access the internet—targeting only specific devices while sparing others on the same network.

This pattern aligns with advanced persistent threats, often linked to state-level or ISP-enabled capabilities.

Background: Part of a Broader Pattern

After fleeing Canada due to chronic digital intrusions and other events stemming from what he believed to be the lawsuits he just filed, Chris continued facing disruptions. VPN instability, selective device blocking, and unexplained connectivity issues prompted deeper investigation. Factory resets provided temporary relief, but problems returned rapidly—classic behavior of persistent malware or remote management exploits

The Attacks: Huawei HG8145V5V3 and ZTE F670L Routers

Key Anomalies Observed:

• 1981 Timestamps: Multiple log entries show dates like 1981-01-01. This is a strong indicator of Real-Time Clock (RTC) reset or deliberate log tampering/manipulation, often seen when firmware is altered or during boot-level interference. Security analysis reports explicitly flag these as “Backdated logs to 1981 (RTC reset or tampering).”
• Custom Firewall Rules & Selective Blocking: Firewall settings changed to “user defined.” Specific devices (Chris’s and his wife’s) lost internet access while others worked, consistent with targeted rules or a Remote Access Trojan (RAT).
• Rapid Re-infection Post-Reset: Issues returned within hours, even on a replacement router from the ISP (Telmex).

From the ZTE Log (August 2025, post-reset):

2025-08-04T16:16:01Z [Error] |dnsmasq| bind interface socket failed 99
2025-08-04T16:16:01Z [Error] !!!!!![high Alert for send msg in POWERON]...
[Warning] RunPCB process[omci] Event[0x3e81]...

High-priority OMCI/GPON messages immediately after boot, IPv6 route injections before full WAN negotiation, and MultiAPD errors point to remote provisioning activity.

From Huawei Logs (July 2025):

Numerous 1981-01-01 entries alongside PPPoE renegotiations, deprecated SSL methods, and DHCP NAKs (potential MAC spoofing or rogue activity). Frequent PPPoE sessions suggest possible DoS or disruption attempts.

Expert Security Analysis

Independent analysis by a professional (using SIEM-style detection) on both routers confirmed:

• TR-069/OMCI remote provisioning activity.
• Backdated logs and tampering indicators.
• Potential RAT presence and DoS patterns.
• Recommendations: Replace/reflash router, disable TR-069, scan devices, and isolate vulnerable hardware (e.g., older Smart TV).

Huawei Router Analysis Report (PDF)

ZTE Router Analysis Report (PDF)

TR-069 (CWMP) Vulnerabilities: This Broadband Forum protocol enables ISPs to remotely manage Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) like routers via an Auto-Configuration Server (ACS), often over port 7547. While intended for legitimate management, it is notoriously exploitable. Compromised ACS servers or weak implementations allow attackers full remote control, DNS redirection, firmware backdoors, and persistent access. It has been weaponized in botnets (e.g., Mirai variants) and enables exactly the selective targeting and re-infection seen here. Many ISPs do not allow users to fully disable it.

Video Evidence: Router Investigations

Watch Chris document the issues in real-time:

Part 1: Initial router access and strange behavior.

Part 2: Firewall changes, selective blocking, and admin interface interference.

Part 3: Factory reset, log downloads, and post-reset observations.

Part 4 (Short): Post-reset functionality vs. actual device connectivity failure.

Implications

These attacks go beyond typical criminal hacking. The precision (device-specific blocking), persistence across hardware swaps, use of ISP-managed protocols, and alignment with other documented sabotage (e.g., Microsoft OneDrive tampering, email spoofing, bank disruptions) point to sophisticated actors with significant resources—potentially leveraging intelligence or ISP cooperation.

Combined with the broader evidence in the Factum (honeypot hits from government networks, Keybase anomalies, etc.), this leaves little doubt that Chris Horlacher’s infrastructure was under targeted surveillance and disruption.

What You Can Do:

• Demand transparency from ISPs on remote management (TR-069/OMCI).
• Support calls for accountability in intelligence oversight.
• Share this post—stories like this highlight risks to innovators and due process.

Full logs and analysis reports (Huawei and ZTE PDFs) are available for review upon request for credible researchers/journalists.

This is not paranoia. This is documented technical evidence of invasive digital warfare against a Canadian entrepreneur and litigant, across national boundaries, violating the property of a foreign ISP.

Stay tuned to equibitlawsuit.com for more updates on the Equibit lawsuits against CSIS and related actors.

Originally published on August 29, 2022 here. It continues to be updated as events progress.

My name is Chris Horlacher. From 2015 to 2019 I ran a federally recognized and subsidized scientific research and development company out of Toronto called Equibit Group. After finally reaching a multimillion dollar valuation through years of work, and with eager customers lining up to use our technology, our company was quite suddenly and inexplicably shattered. Critical portions of our company’s work and research were stolen or destroyed, attempts were made to frame us for securities fraud, and my wife and I were harassed by the Canadian government for nearly 2 years.

This is our story:

With the invention of cryptocurrency after the shakeup of the 2008 worldwide financial crisis, Equibit saw an opportunity to greatly simplify securities trading and reduce users reliance on the large financial institutions who’d been a major point of failure in 2008 and who, from investors perspective, presented an enormous risk to their assets. Our team invested in the creation of the world’s first decentralized, blockchain-based, securities registration and communications system. This technology was, and still is, absolutely cutting edge. Our wallet could even perform cross-chain atomic swaps without ever leaving the application, a technological feat that has still never been replicated.

Had Equibit continued, it would have reduced costs and errors associated with settlements and investor communications. In plain English, this would have quickly replaced traditional financial sector methods for trading securities by being vastly more efficient and by cutting out several layers of middlemen. We were poised to completely disrupt the securities transfer agent and custodian sector, an industry which costs investors and issuers over $10 billion per year, processing quadrillions of dollars worth of transactions annually. As a long term industry insider, most recently as CFO of the Canadian-based arm of an international securities broker-dealer, I knew very well the enormous amount of waste involved in this dark corner of the industry. With our extensive credentials and the success of our technological development, private equity groups couldn’t wait to use our platform, and those who interestedly met with us collectively managed trillions of dollars.

In December 2016, as part of our legal preparation for launching the Equibit platform, we engaged a law firm to investigate Equibit and prepare an analysis regarding EQB’s, our blockchain’s native cryptocurrency, potential status as a security. After extensive investigation into the details of Equibit, lawyers from Davies, Ward, Philips & Vineberg, the top securities law firm in the country, arrived at the conclusion that Equibit’s cryptocurrency was not a security under the Pacific Coin test, basically the same thing as the US Howey test. We then sought the perspective of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) on the Equibit technology we had developed thus far. In order to continue moving forward, we voluntarily requested a determination from OSC as to whether they thought Equibit’s native cryptocurrency (EQB) was a security. I was encouraged by the OSC Launchpad leader, Pat Chaukos, to “keep going” with our work. Similarly, OSC Launchpad attorney Amy Tsai referred us back to our own counsel for any questions about securities law. As our attorneys had advised us that EQB would not be considered a security under the law, we moved forward and began a sale of pre-mined EQB’s, which is the traditional method of funding new protocol development.

Beginning in early 2017, we suddenly experienced a full-scale assault by the OSC. After starting a sale of pre-mined EQBs (“Equibits”), we were dragged into OSC offices and interrogated based solely on an “anonymous” tip (i.e., from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service). Ignoring all previous discussion and determinations, OSC proceeded unilaterally with a quasi-enforcement procedure (and later, an actual enforcement procedure complete with secret gag orders) to stop sales of EQB. We fully complied with them, of course, and continued to communicate with OSC in support of our project – including sending them the nine page expert opinion from Davies, Ward, Philips & Vineberg. After some prodding, the OSC ultimately acknowledged to us that they had never even bothered to read any of our offering documents before acting. Even after receiving the expert opinion, which they took months before acknowledging, they simply dismissed it without explanation or reasoning. This was despite overwhelming support for our assessment across the international regulatory community.

Though incredibly hostile toward us, the meetings did eventually conclude with OSC telling us – on the record – to go ahead and complete our sale of the pre-mined EQB’s. Regardless, from that point onward the OSC’s behavior towards the company, my wife and myself became crude, deceitful, and malicious. All my interactions with OSC are documented in detail in an internal company memo originally published in early 2018 and continuously updated with ongoing details until the end of 2019.

It is now well known amongst lawyers across Ontario that Launchpad has been engaged in a systematic entrapment scheme, devastating every company that has come through their doors. They are single-handedly responsible for the dearth of quality companies in the crypto industry throughout Canada – a country that has had every opportunity to emerge as a global leader in the cryptocurrency space. Not only have they stood firmly in the way of legitimate developers, but the OSC stood idly by and did nothing while well-known frauds like BitConnect were being reported to them. To their credit, they eventually did issue a warning to investors some three months after the BitConnect ponzi-scheme had already collapsed.

In mid-2018 our lead developer suddenly disappeared for two weeks. When he returned, he informed us that he’d been hauled down to CSIS’s offices and interrogated for hours by two agents that he refused to identify to us. According to him, CSIS was intimately aware of internal, non-public details regarding Equibit’s technology, and induced him to reveal additional details regarding the company by leveraging his desire to become a Canadian citizen (he was a Russian immigrant). After revealing this to us, he said he had been granted Canadian citizenship and stunningly requested a promotion to the company’s “inner circle”. Then, just days later, he inexplicably resigned from Equibit, deleted the sole copy of Equibit’s most recent code, and ceased all communications with us.

As you can imagine, not only was this devastating to the project, it had a deeply chilling effect on the entire team. However, we were determined to press on. Without the ability to continue in Canada, my wife and I picked up everything and moved to Switzerland to try to save the company. We were welcomed with open arms by the Swiss, and Equibit received a “no-action” letter from their securities regulator – essentially a written confirmation that we were free to operate as planned without registration or oversight by them. They agreed that EQB was not a security, and affirmed that Equibit’s activities were not of a nature requiring reporting to or oversight by financial regulators, confirming we could continue unabated with the sale in order to fund and finalize development of the protocol. Unfortunately, after several hundred thousand dollars in costs dealing with OSC, the loss of critical portions of our code, and with the sudden collapse of crypto markets in late 2018, Equibit had become impossible to salvage.

Around this same time, while attending World Crypto Con in November 2018, my wife was attacked and drugged by two men who were witnessed (and thankfully prevented from) attempting to kidnap her. I have positively identified the two men as Australian nationals Rev Nissan, a so-called “crypto influencer” who posts a lot of “not investment advice” shilling – and profiting from – high risk crypto investments, and Azzam Elterekmani, who Rev introduced as his “cousin”. I suspect they may have been acting as Australian agents for the Five Eyes network (which only gained the pretense of oversight in 2017), as they routinely drug and even rape their targets.

We also personally know of at least two additional people who were drugged at the same conference, and it stands to reason that World Crypto Con 2018 was a hotbed of espionage activity. It was shortly after this incident that I also experienced a SIM-swap attack – which is a sophisticated, targeted attack used to intercept someone’s phone calls and messages. Fortunately, I had already taken measures to protect myself against these kinds of attacks (never, ever use SMS-based 2 factor authentication!) and so the damage was very limited. This attack was followed on July 3, 2021 by an attempt to steal my time-based one-time-password tokens out of Authy, a service that stores these encrypted tokens on their servers. Again, and fortunately, I do not actually use the Authy service and only registered for it. So, no damages were suffered.

With the failure of the company all but assured, in mid-February 2019 we decided to move from Switzerland back home to Canada. Upon our arrival, we were singled out and searched by airport customs. Despite being some of the only actual Canadian citizens on this flight, we were the only people out of an entire plane load of mostly non-Canadians to receive this enhanced screening. It was obvious that we had been flagged by Canadian authorities for unknown reasons. At the end of a thorough but ultimately fruitless search, the embarrassed customs agent proclaimed “Not everyone is as honest as you.”

I spent the next few months winding up the company, paying our vendors and severance to employees, and doing my best to mitigate any more losses. We had been destroyed by our own government for the “crime” of trying to do something innovative and positive. It took many months to heal from my depression and get back on my feet, and in 2020 and 2021 I filed several lawsuits against CSIS and the perpetrators of this travesty. I knew I would be surveilled and attacked again, so I created a trap for them within my home network (a honeypot named “Equibit-DEV”) to test my theory. Immediately after filing my lawsuits, someone began breaking into my home network and hit the honeypot I had set up for them several times. They also tried hacking my contact lists to figure out who I was talking to. Just so you know, your Bell and Roger’s gateways are back doors for the government to snoop on your entire network. That’s why they insist you use them instead of your own router.

It’s worth mentioning that, on Edward Snowden’s recommendation, I reached out to Citizen Lab, a group of IT security specialists holding themselves out as aid for activists and journalists targeted by corrupt states, via email with my situation and asked for their help. Though my email was forwarded multiple times internally, and I have the DMARC reports and read receipts to prove it, I received no response nor even an acknowledgment of my email. One by one I reached out to their entire team and received the same wall of silence. The Canada-based Citizen Labs wanted nothing to do with a Canadian citizen targeted by Canada’s government.

I also served ATIP requests on CSIS for everything they had on me and my company, which were, tellingly, refused on national security grounds. When I complained to the Office of the Information Commissioner, the OIC first attempted to elicit privileged information from my case against CSIS and then simply dismissed my complaint with no consideration given to its actual substance.

In the meantime the CSIS saboteur I had charged, Sergei Sachkov, defaulted on his obligation to file a statement of defense – meaning that, legally, they have admitted to the truth of all my allegations. The government similarly defaulted on filing its defense, but eventually filed, nearly a year after it was due, an entirely inappropriate two-page denial of any knowledge of the events I alleged. So much for the right to a speedy and fair trial in Canada.

At the end of 2018, as my company was crumbling, CSIS director David Vigneault had the nerve to unironically deliver a speech to the Economic Club of Canada warning their members about industrial espionage. He also said “accountability is at the center of everything we do”, which strikes me as utterly hypocritical coming from the head of an organization that is exempted from key sections of the Criminal Code, been caught repeatedly lying to judges in order to obtain warrants, destroying evidence a court ordered them to produce, destroying a file on Pierre Trudeau that was about to fall into public hands, engaging in illegal data collection and retention, and is generally known as a cesspool of racism, sexism and other forms of bigotry. Most recently they have even been implicated in a case of child trafficking involving three girls, two of whom are now dead. The third is being held in a Syrian rape camp and her three children (ostensibly all from rape) are also now all dead.

Even though CSIS’s own terrorist reporting system provides no indication that cryptocurrencies are being used by terrorists, which is confirmed by a 33-year CIA veteran’s detailed analysis as well as my own ATIP requests on that matter, the people at CSIS, OSC, and other agencies within the Canadian government still proceed under the assumption that cryptocurrency developers are de-facto criminals who must be stopped at all costs. They would love nothing more than for you to believe it is something put forth only by misfits and miscreants. My own resume says differently.

I believe CSIS intended to turn Equibit Group into another debacle used to scare the public away from cryptocurrencies – something they are terrified of. The intelligence community is heavily reliant on financial surveillance and, in return for government protection of the industry (cartelization, bailouts, and direct subsidies), requires financial institutions to act essentially as an arm of the government in data collection, enforcement, and suppression.

The acts described above are the subject of two active lawsuits, together covering over $140 million in damages, which have been filed with the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (File #: CV-20-00645492-0000 and CV-21-00654929-0000). One of the key defendants, former Equibit employee Christian Saucier, is still at large and we have been unable to locate him even after employing the services of professional investigators. The investigators are unanimously of the opinion that he is being concealed by powerful interests.

Despite my best efforts to get ANY attention on these events, all media and political actors have consistently refused to look at anything related to this case. For example, Pierre Poilievre recently expressed views that he was favorable towards the cryptocurrency industry, claiming he wants to make Canada the “blockchain capital of the world”. This is a lie. Pierre’s office is aware of my situation and has told me in writing that they will say nothing and do nothing. Equibit could have been one of the premier blockchain companies in Canada, even the world. But Pierre and other establishment fixtures will do nothing for us – nor, ultimately, for anyone else in our industry. It is up to us alone to ensure the rest of the world knows what happened, what is happening, and what will continue to happen if we don’t make a change.

In the past I had been interviewed and published by leading media outlets, including American Banker, CBC, BNN, Bloomberg, Forbes, and The Globe and Mail, and had spoken before large audiences at countless prominent industry events since 2014. Now no one wants to hear this story, my story. Remember the immortal words of Desmond Tutu,

If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor.

During the darkest moments of this whole experience, I was blessed with two amazing children. I had expected to raise them in a world made better by blockchain, cryptocurrency, and Equibit. Instead I have been given the challenge of explaining to them just what kind of world they actually live in and I can only hope they will have the strength to make it in such an environment. I wish I could tell them to follow their dreams, and that with hard work they will be free to make a lasting contribution to humanity – but look where that got Equibit and all the people who believed in our vision of the future. We live in a world where the successful “innovators” of our time are only in those positions because they were placed there by even more powerful interests who don’t want their boat rocked. Anyone building things that can truly upset the status quo are quickly eliminated, their stories buried, and the world goes on never knowing what could have been.

So I’m asking for your help. Please, forward this story to your email lists. Post it to your forums and blogs. Write about it. If you know where Christian Saucier is, tell me. I am giving this information away freely and if you think you can help, write to me (PGP). If you are in a similar situation, let’s join forces. Make it impossible for the world to ignore what the Trudeau regime and the disgusting Western espionage alliance (Five Eyes) are doing to activists, entrepreneurs, and innovators the world over.

Update 09/01/2022 – Last night, without any warning, Telegram deleted the account and banned the phone number that I had been using to distribute this story for the last few days. The account was registered using a phone number that was not tied to my identity (it was a friend’s number), meaning it was the information itself that prompted the account deletion.