There is no fire at Binance yet, but the smoke is filling the building.

Following the collapse of FTX all eyes have turned to the other opaque offshore exchanges, waiting and wondering which could be insolvent and about to detonate next. The similarities between FTX and Binance are numerous which is a major cause for concern. In the Crypto industry often where there’s smoke, there’s fire.

Binance’s Similarities with FTX

Both exchanges are located offshore, outside of the reach of major nation regulators. While FTX appears to have been cozy with the regulators in the Bahamas; Binance seems to have no fixed address, instead hopping between jurisdictions looking for friendly regulators along the way. This hasn’t been limited only to suspect jurisdictions like Dubai and Singapore, Binance most recently cozied up to regulators in France, gaining registration in the region as a home base for European operations.

We have very little information in the corporate structure of Binance. What little we do know is that there appears to be a complex web of ownership and subsidiaries scattered across various jurisdictions.

As Bloomberg put it in June: Binance “is based in who knows where and owned by god knows whom.”

The similarity in the exchange tokens offered by each company is obvious. FTX famously offered their FTT token to give discounts to users on the front end. Behind the scenes the token allowed FTX and their associated hedge fund, Alameda Research, to functionally print their own collateral to take loans against and use to fund buyouts throughout the industry.

Binance’s BNB token had similar origins, but has now moved on to become the ecosystem token for the fully fledged Ethereum competitor, Binance Smart Chain. There is no direct evidence that Binance has leveraged BNB in a similar way that FTX used FTT; but it’s not difficult to imagine some of the same balance sheet tricks have been used.

We do know that Binance operates a large ecosystem incubator called Binance Launchpad. This program allows startups to access funding in exchange for launching their projects on Binance Smart Chain. Recently details have emerged indicating that in order to list tokens on Binance, projects would be required to post a sizeable insurance deposit with the exchange. These deposits would be denominated in BNB, adding additional demand for the token.

Binance was the first money into FTX

Back in 2019, when FTX was getting off the ground they took on Binance as their first strategic investor. The size of the Binance investment remains undisclosed but we do know that alongside this investment, Binance received a sizable allocation of FTT tokens.

In July 2021, FTX suddenly bought out Binance’s stake, again for an undisclosed amount. What we didn’t know at the time was that despite raising $900M from fresh investors at the same time, FTX still funded a portion of the buyout using FTT tokens rather than fiat currency.

Binance was building up a gigantic bag of FTT tokens.

We all know what happened next, in November this year Binance CEO CZ announced that they would be divesting of their FTT tokens, crashing the market and shortly afterwards resulting in the bankruptcy of FTX.

While this background is important, it doesn’t necessarily follow that Binance is also insolvent. The links between FTX and Binance are simply too deep to ignore. The similarities in strategy are too many to dismiss as merely a coincidence.

It is entirely possible that Binance runs its business using exactly the same tricks as FTX but at a much larger scale.

Have you got my money?

Over the past several weeks, customers have decided to test the liquidity of Binance. After the collapse of FTX, Binance was one of the few exchanges that were seen as relatively trustworthy and saw inflows as users moved funds around. This all stopped recently when Binance published their “proof-of-reserves”.

Binance tried to promote their proof-of reserves report as an audit. It was nothing of the sort.

The report showed that Binance did indeed have some wallets with billions of dollars worth of Bitcoin in them. The report didn’t prove anything about non-Bitcoin assets and reserves. It didn’t prove how much the exchange owed to customers.

The report didn’t even prove that Binance had control of the wallets.

Industry figures immediately called Binance out. Kraken CEO Jesse Powell was particularly strong in his warning that the report proved basically nothing. The audit firm that conducted the report stopped working with Crypto firms shortly afterwards and deleted all of their publicly available Crypto reports, including the Binance reports.

Does Binance have enough reserves? Probably, but customers weren’t waiting around to find out.

In the week after the report was published, customers withdrew around $8B worth of assets. An additional $5B in assets flowed into the exchange, however some of these flows appeared to be emergency liquidity provided by other firms, used to service withdrawals. At one stage Binance halted withdrawals of USDC, claiming that they needed to wait for regular banking hours to top up their wallets.

Just like FTX, customers were draining the funds out of Binance.

Binance has largely serviced the withdrawals so far. That’s to be expected, it’s a gigantic entity and has a large amount of reserves. It might not have enough reserves to service withdrawals indefinitely, but for now the funds appear to be flowing.

What’s different this time?

Taking a closer look at the FTX run on deposits can give us some insight into how and why Binance might ultimately fail. The biggest difference between the two exchange runs is that the run on FTX began with a sell off in the exchange token, FTT. In contrast Binance’s BNB token has taken some punishment but the sell off has been nowhere near as extreme.

If Binance is running the same shell game as FTX, they will be solvent until BNB drops in value.

At FTX, the exchange token and various other Solana ecosystem tokens were the lifeblood of the exchange’s balance sheet. FTX and Alameda were holding FTT as a significant chunk of reserves, their internal financials were leveraged off FTT, and FTT was the major collateral held at external lenders.

FTX only hit problems when that collateral value fell and lenders pulled their credit lines.

According to Nansen, Binance holds around $54B in reserves. We don’t know what the liabilities attached to these assets are, but around $5.5B of these assets are BNB tokens. We know that Binance subsidizes margin loans for users using BNB as collateral. We know that 20% of BNB tokens are held off market and do not circulate (this is not uncommon for 2017-present era cryptos). We do not know how much of Binance’s business is based on leveraging BNB collateral. We have no idea whether Binance has an embedded market maker, like Alameda Research. We do know that Binance has cold wallets and reserves, while no one could ever find cold wallets for FTX.

There isn’t an obvious problem with Binance so far, but if something is going to break over at Binance it will likely start with a rapid devaluation of BNB tokens, rather than a bank run.

What happens next?

Binance has already weathered a major run. BNB has drawn down by almost 30% since problems showed up at FTX in early November. The stress is palpable, but at the end of the day Binance is a juggernaut. It is the largest exchange by a long way. It has daily volumes an order of magnitude larger than all of its competitors bar Coinbase. We know there are reserves and the exchange has been servicing a huge amount of withdrawals with relatively small hiccups.

I still don’t trust Binance. There is no reason to store your coins on Binance unless you are trading them.

I fully expect that a gigantic amount of Binance’s business is leveraged off BNB being used as collateral, and that if the value of BNB drops too much it causes some major problems. But I don’t know for sure. In June, while the rest of the Crypto markets were blowing up BNB was defended strongly at $200. Make of that what you will.

Overall these problems at Binance feel a lot like previous waves of FUD surrounding Tether. The entire thing looks and seems dodgy, but over the last 5 years basically everyone who has been too enthusiastic and piled into shorts has been chewed up and spat out.

The casino isn’t fair, but betting that the house will break is usually a losing bet.

Stepping back, I don’t think that Binance will end up blowing up like FTX did. They don’t seem to be taking the same sorts of risk with their business operations. If there is an issue that ends up bringing down Binance it seems much more likely that a major regulatory crackdown does the just than just a run on deposits.

There are plenty of angles that could get attacked by regulators. Binance operates a regulated Crypto on-ramp in a multitude of jurisdictions. They are allowed to accept bank deposits through these entities. Any major attempt to shut down Binance via these local on-ramps could have significant ripple effects throughout the rest of the Binance empire by constricting fresh deposits.

For now, Binance looks the shakiest it has since 2018. They have giant reserves and regulatory obfuscation. They’ve also been playing this game for a long time and have grown the largest among competitors.

That’s not a good excuse to leave your funds there. This is one you want to watch from the outside (Editor’s note: We’re so adamant you should be self-custodying your Bitcoin that we’ll even pay you to do it. )

Eventually Binance could break, and I don’t want to wait to find out. For now, there is no fire. Only lots and lots of smoke.

Today’s post is from contributing analyst Scott Hill. To receive further updates of this series and our overall investment thesis for digital assets (even in this climate), subscribe to the Bombthrower mailing list. 

This is the third and final part in our recap of the collapse of FTX. In the first two issues we covered what happened in the weeks leading up to the failure of the exchange and how Alameda Research and FTX became so entangled and fraudulent in the first place.

Today we’ll cover the contagion and fallout throughout the Crypto industry and some lessons learned by Crypto investors and industry insiders.

Leveraged Unwind

The Contagion that we are seeing from the failure of FTX is mainly an unwind of built up debt between Crypto companies. This is acting with a lag as a majority of companies with financial problems were already on the ropes from earlier in the year as a result of the collapse of Luna/Terraform labs and Three Arrows Capital.

The list of Crypto lenders that have so far filed for bankruptcy as a result of these earlier problems include Voyager, Celsius and BlockFi. Gemini’s yield program has halted withdrawals. Nexo has announced that they will exit US markets but have not yet announced financial problems.

If you haven’t already, you should strongly consider whether any of the yield generating accounts at Crypto companies are worth the risk.

 These failures are all a result of counterparties defaulting on loans. Essentially, Crypto hedge funds and other entities took on loans from these lenders during the bull market and have failed to repay this year. To compound this issue towards the end of 2021 and in early 2022 the Crypto lending space was so competitive that loan terms were extremely favorable.

Lenders were growing rapidly and courting new investors. To be successful they needed to grow their loan book at any cost.

Kyle Davies, a co-founder at Three Arrows Capital explained in this interview that his Fund was offered billions of dollars in loaned funds on an uncollateralized basis. Other lenders were making loans on low quality collateral. Some were slow to liquidate loans as collateral value dropped.

This mechanism was a large part of the story of the FTX collapse. It appears that loans from other companies were being taken using FTT tokens and FTX stock as collateral with no plausible way to liquidate those assets anywhere near book value.

This is widely speculated to be the reason why FTX CEO Sam Bankman Fried attempted to bail out insolvent lenders like Voyager and BlockFi earlier this year, to ensure that they did not liquidate his FTT collateral.

This means that the contagion is very different to previous eras of Crypto collapse. It’s not hacks that are causing issues as happened in 2014. It’s not voluntary selling of assets as we saw in 2017 with ICO treasuries. It’s insolvent companies with giant holes in their balance sheets from defaulted loans.

DCG and Genesis

This brings us to the Genesis of all of the leverage in the Crypto industry, Digital Currency Group (DCG) and their subsidiary lending and prime broking service, Genesis. So far Genesis appears to have at least $1.8B owed to creditors. Its parent company DCG is on the hook for $575M that comes due in May next year and another $1.1B owed to Genesis in 2032.

Details are limited and DCG has gone quiet, but it appears that DCG has already committed to backstopping part of the faltering Genesis loan book.

We have no real idea how deep the hole is at Genesis. In early 2021 we learned that their total loans outstanding stood at $3.8B. This had increased by more than 5x since June 2020. It’s not inconceivable that Genesis had $10B in loans owed to it when it halted withdrawals in November. With so much carnage rippling through the industry it’s impossible to know how many of those loans are still performing and how many have defaulted leaving bad debt on the books.

For the first time since its 2013 founding, the DCG empire could be crumbling.

 While you aren’t all that familiar with Genesis as their dealings are mainly with other large Crypto firms, you are definitely familiar with the family of DCG companies. DCG owns Coindesk and Grayscale, which operates the Grayscale Bitcoin Trust. They also hold one of the largest venture portfolios in the industry, with fingers in almost every pie.

Among other things, Genesis loans are used as the counterparty to many yield products throughout the industry. The first shoe to drop was Gemini’s yield program, which simply passes through Genesis loans onto consumers, which is why they were forced to gate withdrawals shortly after Genesis.

Problems at DCG are problems throughout the Crypto asset class.

As the major Crypto prime broker and lending provider, the halting of withdrawals at Genesis is a major problem. Even if the lender can tidy up its books and continue to operate, their pause in normal operations likely means that Credit and business operating loans throughout the industry are much more constricted than normal.

How will Genesis Shake Out

Problems at DCG are not the same as problems at smaller Crypto Firms. The company has a wide range of assets that they can sell off to recapitalize the business and can seek outside investment if push comes to shove. There have been rumors about fundraising attempts while an offer to purchase Coindesk for $300M was apparently rejected as too low a bid. The main point is that DCG appears to need additional funding to maintain operations, but it might not be at a crisis point where the whole company is about to go under.

For example, early rumors that the Grayscale Bitcoin Trust could be liquidated seem to be unfounded.

That’s not to say that there aren’t deep problems. It would not be at all surprising if Genesis were sold off or allowed to enter bankruptcy. A sale of Coindesk would not be surprising. The total collapse of DCG and the sale of Grayscale, one of the major revenue sources for the corporate group, would be surprising to say the least.

With all that said, we just don’t know. DCG has been uncharacteristically quiet for weeks and nothing they have said inspires any confidence.

Silvergate

Another institutional Crypto company having problems is Silvergate bank. Silvergate is a US registered and publicly listed bank whose place in the industry was providing banking services to Crypto companies. In 2017 Crypto companies had awful trouble finding reliable banking services who would not close accounts. Silvergate fixed that and gained most of the banking business in the industry.

They claim not to have any exposure to FTX, but they were the banking partner

This opens up two big problems. Firstly, a major part of the FTX story was the dubious banking arrangement, where customers were asked to wire funds to the affiliated hedge fund, Alameda Research, rather than to FTX bank accounts. CEO Sam Bankman-Fried claims that FTX did not have access to banking at the time, but it appears that this practise carried on far longer than could be considered reasonable.

If Silvergate were aware of this arrangement and allowed it to continue, regulators will have some serious questions to ask.

The second and more minor issue is that banking naturally carries significant settlement risk as funds are debited and credited across accounts, sometimes opening up short term loans as settlement finalizes. It doesn’t appear that FTX has left a big gap in Silvergate balances through settlement failures, but it’s a possibility.

The other angle here is that if Silvergate had a major part to play in improper banking for FTX, they could find themselves liable for fines and even clawbacks of funds into the FTX bankruptcy. Members of Congress have already asked for information and it seems likely that a regulatory investigation is coming.

Solana Ecosystem and Wrapped Tokens

It’s no secret that FTX and Alameda had a big role in investing in and guiding the Solana ecosystem. Sam Bankman-Fried and associates had an outsized position in several ecosystem tokens like Serum and Maps. Solana token price has already been cut in half since FTX failed and ecosystem tokens are even more badly down.

The less obvious problem in Solana was that the major wrapped assets were custodied by FTX. Sollet, the wrapped Bitcoin token is currently trading at a 95% discount to Bitcoin. Most traders missed this small but important point as the FTX collapse was happening, but it’s a useful piece of information to keep in mind.

Not all wrapped assets are created equal.

 If you participate in DeFi you no doubt use wrapped assets. They allow you to trade and use assets from one blockchain on a different one or sometimes just provide a different token standard as a wrapper.

The major wrapped assets to be aware of are wBTC and wETH. The differences are important and useful to understand.

In the week after the FTX collapse there was a Twitter joke about wETH having problems. This led the asset to depeg from normal ETH tokens, despite being exchangeable 1 for 1. Articles were written in an attempt to calm panicked sellers of the wrapped token after the joke was reported seriously by Bloomberg.

Types of Wrapped Tokens

Wrapped ETH is a token which places an ERC-20 wrapper around ETH token, allowing it to take advantage of more advanced features of the Ethereum Blockchain. This process is handled entirely by a smart contract. The stash of ETH tokens can be viewed on the blockchain. The total supply of wrapped ETH can be audited in real time to monitor for problems. Nothing can go wrong with this system and funds can’t be stolen unless there is a smart contract exploit.

A big part of what makes wETH extremely safe is that it is self contained in the Ethereum ecosystem.

These sorts of smart contract wrapped tokens are similar to bridged assets. These wrapped tokens also operate by smart contract, but across different blockchains. They feature smart contracts on both blockchains which will custody native tokens and mint wrapped tokens on a different blockchain as requested by users on a 1 for 1 basis. At least that’s what they do when they’re operating properly.

Bridged tokens often break and have security exploits, the technology is extremely complicated and open to hacks.

Bridge exploits are by far the most common DeFi hack, with more than $2.5B stolen from bridges in the last two years.

The final type of wrapped asset is a custodial wrapped asset, which includes the Solana wrapped assets which were custodied by FTX and other more commonly used wrapped assets like wBTC and stETH on Ethereum. wBTC is custodied by BitGo and operated by a DAO, they have fairly good transparency and seem unlikely to suffer problems, but it’s important to be aware that if BitGo goes into bankruptcy, wBTC could have issues. stETH is issued primarily by Lido and is set up in a similar way with similar risks.

The main point is that if you are using wrapped assets, you should understand who holds the custody of the underlying token and whether they are at risk of financial problems.

Solana Wrapped assets are trading at a giant discount and unlikely to be fully convertible. I don’t think there’s a high likelihood that wBTC or stETH have similar issues, but it’s worthwhile being aware that they could have problems. If you’re holding wrapped tokens, know who the counterparty that can unwrap them is and whether or not they are trustworthy and solvent.

Lessons

Here are the big take-aways from all this…

Self Custody

The first and most important lesson out of this giant mess is that every investor in Crypto needs to know how to self-custody their assets. It’s the same lesson that was learned out of the 2014 Mt Gox collapse. It’ll likely be the lesson from the next Crypto crisis.

There is no excuse. Learn how to take custody of your Crypto. Easy self-custody is the major innovation.

There’s a range of options, if you’re only dabbling then use a software wallet like Metamask or Exodus. If you’re a little more serious you’ll want a hardware wallet like a Ledger or a Trezor which are available for less than $100. At the high end it might be worth considering a shared recovery service like Casa.

Whichever way you go, know how to Self Custody. Know how to move your Crypto off an exchange and onto your wallet. Practice doing it so that you can remove your funds when things go poorly.

During the FTX collapse, the people that could remove their Crypto the day that things started looking bad kept their coins. Others lost theirs.

Know Your Counterparty

The firms in the Crypto industry are not like banks or stock exchanges. They don’t have anywhere near the same regulatory scrutiny. They don’t have the same insurance. They don’t do the same audits.

This isn’t the wild west, but it’s still close.

If you’re giving your money or your Crypto over to an exchange or custodian know your counterparty. Know their counterparty. Read the terms of service and see what the risks are. The most surprising failure out of the FTX collapse was Gemini Earn closing down. They weren’t exposed to FTX but they used Genesis who suffered losses in the FTX collapse.

As a general rule, if you’re earning yield then your Crypto is being lent out. At the moment most of the yield products are closed down or bankrupt, but keep this in mind for next time. It doesn’t even have to be your chosen custodian that has problems, this industry is small and most firms have exposure to a wide range of counter-parties.

Always gauge whether the risk associated with the yield you’re getting is worth it. During this cycle plenty of investors lost their entire investment because they were chasing 10% yields. When the next bear market starts, your first thought should be whether you still want exposure to lending firms.

Know what you own

Not all Crypto assets are created equal. If you’re dabbling in altcoins and DeFi, know how the tokens you own are connected to the larger ecosystem.

As we already covered, wrapped assets have unique risks and that needs to be recognized. Ecosystem tokens, that is altcoins within a broader protocol should be viewed as having a strong correlation to the ecosystem they live in.

Problems in one place can easily spread.

Understanding how these tokens move together and how problems in one part can affect other parts is vital as the Crypto token ecosystems get more and more interlinked.

Proof of Solvency

While my advice would be to not have any tokens on any exchange or with any custodian at the moment, that’s not practical for everyone and people do need to trade sometimes. Ryan Sean Adams at Bankless has coined a phrase that I think explains how to think of exchanges at the moment:

Think of an exchange like a public restroom. Go in, do your business, and get out.

This isn’t the period where you want to hold assets on an exchange without a good reason. We’re heading into Christmas which is historically a low liquidity period. While a lot of insolvent firms have been flushed out, it feels decidedly like there are more shoes to drop.

While Binance has performed a proof of reserves there are numerous problems with their approach and some weird activity on their order books has left traders nervous. It’s unthinkable that Binance could be insolvent, but I wouldn’t want to have any funds there at the moment.

Kraken is the exchange that has the longest history of doing proof of reserves. Their CEO has recently been pointing out problems with other firms auditing, including Binance. He has also been advocating self custody.

If you need to keep assets on an exchange, Kraken appears to be safer than most, but their CEO is telling you not to keep your assets on any exchange.

Coinbase is the other big exchange. They’re publicly listed. They’re rigorously audited. Does that mean they’re safe? No. Do I trust them not to have problems? No. But they’re also safer than most.

There should be no real reason to keep a lot of Crypto assets on an exchange at the moment. If you plan on doing so, make sure you know how to get them off the exchange in a hurry.

Watch out for the next blowups

This all could be over. It also might not be. The blow ups in the first half of this year were fast and destructive. Luna and Three Arrows Capital blew up and took out huge chunks of the industry overnight.

This time around the blow ups are slow and large.

Genesis looks like it’s going to take December off and then come back and talk to creditors next year. Their parent company DCG is a multi-billion dollar behemoth. If they are going to blow up they are going to do it slowly. It takes forever to unwind an entity as large as Genesis.

The good news if you don’t have exposure to any of the already bankrupt firms is that most of them have already gone through the period where they sold off all of their assets in a fire sale. FTX was the poster boy for this phenomenon, ending their life with zero Bitcoin on their balance sheet, despite billions in Bitcoin owed to customers.

If more things explode, there likely won’t be a fire sale of coins rushing to market.

I fully expect there to be at least two additional offshore exchanges blow up in the next 6 months. I don’t expect them to have a large amount of assets to sell off, but things could get weird and an exchange blowing up will impact the price of tokens.

The Tail Risk is still out there

The Stablecoins are the biggest question mark still left on the board. After years of assurances, we still haven’t seen Tether’s books with any real certainty. Circle recently canceled its public market debut and will no longer be providing public financial reports. The less said about Binance USD the better and the other more minor stablecoins are plagued with questions.

Stablecoins are not dollars in a bank. If you want US dollars, own US dollars.

US short term government treasuries are currently yielding almost 4%. Bank accounts have insurance. There’s really no reason to be holding a large amount of stablecoins in this environment unless you’re using them in DeFi.

I don’t want to bet against Tether. Shorting Tether is the widowmaker trade in Crypto. Even if you’re right, your counterparty will likely be insolvent and won’t pay out.

I don’t even really think that Tether will fail in this cycle, but it’s a tail risk to be wary of.

Stick around for the next cycle

The biggest takeaway from all of this is that Crypto isn’t going anywhere. Bitcoin isn’t dead.

If you’re here already, stick around. Fortunes are made in bear markets and collected in bull markets. Learn about the space. Hone your strategies. Figure out what you want to own and why. Get ready to deploy funds when the Crypto winter is waning.

The Federal Reserve can’t stop printing money forever

Today’s post is from contributing analyst Scott Hill. To receive further updates of this series and our overall investment thesis for digital assets (even in this climate), subscribe to the Bombthrower mailing list. 

Last week we covered the collapse of FTX as it happened but there’s a lot more to the story. How did FTX grow from a tiny Hong Kong bucket shop into a top three Crypto exchange over the course of just a few years? What was Alameda research and were they ever legitimate? Most importantly, how exactly does an exchange lose track of up to $10 billion worth of customer deposits?

Most of this material is still an educated guess, but the guessers are out there putting together clues from private discussions which have been leaked, the bankruptcy proceedings and first hand dealings shared on Crypto Twitter.

It’s worth noting that there is a whole deep state angle to this story.

I won’t go into it in this article because so little is known (see endnote – ed.)

What we do know is mostly confined to the fact that FTX CEO Sam Bankman-Fried (SBF) was the second largest donor to Democrat political campaigns since 2019. His Co-CEO for part of the FTX Empire, Ryan Salame, was a top 10 donor to the Republican party in the same period.

Sam Bankman-Fried met with SEC Chairman Gary Gensler seeking a “no action” letter on an enforcement matter in April, shortly before SBF began pushing the DCCPA, a bill which the Crypto industry mainly saw as a subtle crackdown on DeFi wrapped in a reasonable sounding regulatory framework.

The biggest question mark is the identity of FTX CTO and co-founder Garry Wang. The man is a ghost with very little online presence and only a handful of photos. Famed short seller Marc Cohodes is under the impression that Wang is a state actor for the CCP.

These questions are important and interesting, but they don’t make for a useful article because of the complete absence of detail.

Alameda Research

Alameda Research, the market maker or crypto hedge fund founded by SBF in Hong Kong during the bull run of 2017 is the start of the rot. The official story is that the firm was formed from a team of young hotshots who learned to trade at Jane Street, a notoriously secretive global market maker which trades more than $10 trillion in securities volume each year.

In January 2018 as Bitcoin was collapsing, Alameda research were performing the Japan arbitrage trade. They purchased Bitcoin in the US, moved it onto Japanese exchanges and cashed in on the gap between markets. The spread was often as wide as 10%. SBF claimed the firm made $10M on the arbitrage over the course of several weeks.

This was a complicated trade. Japanese capital controls are strict with only Japanese nationals allowed to hold bank accounts, making it extremely difficult to get the money out of Japan and requiring a reasonable level of sophistication and corporate legitimacy to pull off.

Following the Japan arbitrage, Alameda went after the “Kimchi Premium”. This was the same type of arbitrage trade, with Bitcoin on South Korean exchanges worth up to 20% more than Bitcoin on US exchanges. The capital controls were tighter, the ability to set up corporate infrastructure in the nation was more restricted and Bitcoin was in the middle of collapsing making trading the asset much more risky.

Some people are suggesting that Alameda lost $10 million on the Kimchi Premium trade, but no one really knows whether any of this story is even true.

I’m deeply skeptical of this entire backstory given what we have now seen about how careful SBF is with his public image.

It’s entirely possible that this whole story was a fabrication to paint the picture of a boy genius trader with a Jane Street pedigree striking out on his own in Crypto land.

Completely Absurd Fundraising

In early 2018, Alameda Research established headquarters in Hong Kong. While SBF was a complete unknown to Crypto insiders at the time, Alameda Research was making a name for itself, frequently up the top of the Bitmex trading leaderboard.

Crypto markets in 2018 were very different to the last few years. While 2017 had seen a burst of activity during Bitcoin’s bull run, volumes were still tiny and there were very few professional firms taking the asset class seriously.

It’s completely plausible that in the absence of professional market makers, Alameda Research could have done very well. It also seems likely that the edge that such a small team had would have disappeared quickly as the market became more professional. Alameda Research only had a handful of employees. Nowhere near enough to build and execute a sophistical algorithmic market making strategy, such as those employed at Jane Street.

In December 2019 an investment pitch deck for Alameda Research circulated among Crypto insiders. The firm was seeking to raise $200 million in debt funding and was offering 15% payments on the debt. The pitch itself made ridiculous claims about the firm’s edge and was riddled with red flags.

“High Returns with no risk – These loans have no downside”

Insiders that viewed the pitch deck were confused. The whispers within the industry were that this firm was highly profitable yet they seemed desperate to raise $200 million. Most stayed away and it’s unclear whether or not the fundraising was successful.

Launch of FTX

FTX was founded in May 2019 but had very little volume until the following year when they established the regulatory status to allow US customers to trade. FTX later acquired Blockfolio to obtain additional US licensing and the bones of a trading app. Even with this boost in volume, FTX was considered an unfavorable exchange to make markets for among established industry participants.

The presumption was that Alameda Research was an embedded market maker that was given an unfair advantage on the platform and rival firms stayed clear.

At the time SBF was still the CEO of both companies. There were claims of a separation of the firms, but it was known that they both operated out of the same offices in Hong Kong. It was rumored that Alameda had full access to customer position data and would hunt for liquidations.

FTX was seen as a shady offshore bucket shop.

By early 2021 little had changed in the industry perception of FTX, but volume was growing. In January SBF was busy arguing on Twitter, leading to the infamous “I’ll buy as much Solana as  you have, right now, at $3” tweet. He was not taken seriously until later that year when this huge Solana bet seemed to pay off.

FTX gains Legitimacy

By the middle of 2021, with Crypto in a raging bull market and FTX capturing significant market share, the exchange became too large to ignore. A big part of the story was China putting in place another round of Crypto bans in September which forced many major Crypto traders and market makers to find new venues to trade.

Zhu Su, founder of disgraced Crypto Hedge fund Three Arrows Capital said recently that he had moved his fund’s trading from Huobi and Okex to FTX and Binance in the wake of the China ban.

FTX gave them extremely favorable terms.

A big reason that firms began to feel comfortable with FTX was the splashy fundraising FTX was able to pull off. Market participants assumed that among the billions of dollars of venture capital money that had been invested in FTX, someone had done basic due diligence on the firm. We now know that during these heady days of free money SBF was demanding investment commitments quickly from VCs or he would move on to the next phone call.

There was a giant line of VCs desperate to get into an FTX round.

The July fundraising list was a who’s who of Silicon Valley VC. Led by Sequoia, the round included Softbank, Temasek and VanEck. Apparently none of these firms insisted on even the most basic corporate controls, like installing a board of directors. A later round included a strategic investment from Blackrock. FTX was a blue ribbon investment.

They all needed Crypto exposure now and FTX was the hottest Crypto startup in town.

The other piece of the puzzle was that trading firms were now making money on FTX, when before they were simply getting their positions hunted by Alameda. Leverage was handed out in ample servings. Compliance was lax. Payouts were quick. It seemed to most that FTX had moved on from its shady beginnings to become a legitimate venue for market makers to use.

Tokens

A giant part of understanding exactly what went down at FTX is understanding the Tokens they had launched or partnered with. In 2019 FTX launched FTT, an Ethereum ecosystem token which represented a cut of exchange fees and offered discounts to traders for holding it. It was the same model that Binance launched their token with in 2017. Tokens would be bought out of the market with a portion of exchange profits on a regular basis, delivering a return to investors.

A huge portion of FTT tokens were held on the FTX balance sheet as an asset.

Even more egregious were the Solana ecosystem tokens which FTX helped launch. The leaked balance sheet showed that FTX had large holdings of Serum, Maps and Oxy.

It showed Serum tokens marked as a $2.2 billion asset. Available market cap at the time was less than $500 million.

We don’t know for sure, but it seems likely that loans were taken out backed by FTT and other minor tokens.

Essentially, it seems that SBF invented his own currency from this air and then took out US dollar loans against it from anyone that would offer. 

We haven’t heard from any major Crypto lender about whether or not they took FTT as collateral. We may never hear an admission on that point. What we do know is that Solana DeFi, where SBF had significant influence, largely took these minor tokens as collateral for loans on much more generous terms than seems reasonable now.

And why wouldn’t Crypto lenders offer loans to FTX on whatever collateral was offered? FTX was the fastest growing exchange in industry history. It had prestigious investors. Its CEO was throwing around cash on advertising and political donations. Surely FTX was profitable enough to service their loans.

So what happened to the money?

When FTX blew up there was a balance sheet hole of somewhere between $6-10 billion. It was reported as “missing customer funds” but judging from recent public comments made by SBF it seems more likely that there was a complex web of loans and cross company funding arrangements than just straight up theft of customer assets.

An underreported part of this story which fills in a key gap is that the offshore FTX entity apparently didn’t have its own bank account. Wires to the offshore exchange would go directly into a bank account held by Alameda Research. It seems that FTX didn’t secretly transfer customer funds to its associated hedge fund, it probably didn’t even make loans between companies.

The most likely explanation is that Alameda Research just had direct access to customer funds  which were wired to them.

While shocking, it wouldn’t be as egregious if the FTX terms didn’t explicitly say that assets were held on trust for customers. FTX wasn’t supposed to touch customer funds once they were deposited. Maybe that’s the whole point, that SBF was relying on some bizarre technicality or legal fiction to convince himself that he had the right to deal with customer assets. Did I mention that both of his parents are compliance lawyers, with one a leading expert on tax havens.

If there’s anyone that could access the advice to set up a complex piece of legal fiction entitling him to pilfer customer funds in a defensible way, it’s SBF.

Liquidations

That only explains how Alameda Research got access to customer funds, but how did they lose the funds? Alameda Research is a market maker primarily and was the key integrated market maker on FTX. Among other things that gave Alameda the ability to purchase liquidated positions of customers, likely at a huge discount.

In a bull market this is a hugely advantaged position to be in. Say Bitcoin drops 5% in an hour and longs get liquidated, Alameda was able to purchase those long Bitcoin positions and then resell them later, after the liquidation cascade was over and price had recovered.

Alameda was exempt from liquidation on FTX, so they could hold underwater positions for as long as they wanted without being forced to close them.
In a bear market, Alameda would likely accumulate underwater positions that they couldn’t get out of without incurring a large loss. Other market makers will generally sell a liquidated position off as soon as possible, to avoid being liquidated themselves. This doesn’t appear to be a check and balance that was in place for Alameda’s operations on FTX.

Another key feature of the leverage trading offered at FTX was cross asset collateral. Essentially this means that leverage was offered on the entire portfolio of a customer. There wasn’t a segregation of collateral, users could simply offer up a mixed list of tokens and take margin loans against the whole pie. This included FTT and Serum at much more generous collateral ratios than other exchanges offered.

Whatever low quality collateral you had, FTX would take it, and it seems that it would end up on Alameda’s books when a customer was liquidated.

Luna Eclipse

In a collapsing market, this lack of controls over Alameda is potentially disastrous. Luna had the most high profile collapse in the history of Crypto tokens in May this year, losing 99.7% of its value in a week before getting as close to absolute zero as possible. FTX and Binance were the major venues for trading the Luna collapse. Traders bought the dip on leverage all the way down.

It seems likely that Alameda took all of those liquidated positions onto their own balance sheet.

Luna started its collapse at around $90. The following week it was at essentially zero. There is no way that Alameda could have sold off all of those liquidated customer positions as the token collapsed. This type of liquidation transaction is known as “toxic flow” and is a surefire way to bankrupt a market maker.

If FTX’s famously specialized liquidation engine simply meant that customer positions were shunted onto the Alameda balance sheet to be cleared at a later date, then the amount of toxic flow from junk tokens in the last year would build up quickly.

This seems to be the only way the size of the hole makes any sense.

Other Problems

If we assume that Luna blew a giant hole in the balance sheets within the FTX empire then what happened next makes a whole lot more sense. SBF went on a buying spree as Crypto lenders collapsed, backstopping insolvent firms and being proclaimed as Crypto’s JP Morgan.

In the cold light of day a more likely explanation than wanting to save the industry is wanting to save himself.

If insolvent Crypto lenders like Voyager and Celsius had given loans to FTX, taking FTT and other minor tokens as collateral then those tokens would be seized and sold into the market during a bankruptcy, cratering the price and liquidating FTX loans with other lenders. Don’t forget, for tokens like Serum, FTX held and likely pledged as collateral more than the entire free float on the market.

All of this isn’t to say that funds didn’t go missing in other ways though.

According to the Bankruptcy filings, FTX had loaned more than $1 billion to SBF individually and $2.3 billion to his investment company, Paper Bird Inc. There were also 9 figure loans to other executives and Bahamas real estate purchased by SBF’s parents and associates worth $300 million. There are even suggestions that the $420 million meme fundraise in October 2021 basically just ended up in the pocket of SBF, rather than productively invested in the company.

It seems like the FTX balance sheet was used as a slush fund for SBF.

None of this in any way can add up to $6-10 billion in stolen customer funds and it’s unlikely that the mechanism was brazen theft. The scenario outlined above, poor trading controls at Alameda creating bad debt within the corporate structure and a CEO that was scrambling to keep the empire afloat, is far more likely. This also casts a new light on the “generous terms” offered to other major market participants in 2021.

Taking VC money

What if Alameda’s goal wasn’t to make money, but to lose money to other traders in a perverse growth hack used to attract the next round of “smart money” investors?

After all, at best Alameda had been making a few hundred million from trading over the course of its existence and likely much less than that. As spreads closed with more market makers flooding into the asset class it’s much easier to take money from Sequoia and Softbank than it is to make money trading.

Running an unprofitable casino is a terrible business, but selling an unprofitable casino that looks extremely busy to a private investor is a fantastic business.

This part of the story seems like the inevitable end state of the 2010s dominance of Venture Capital and private investing. After a decade of easy money, low interest loans and an insatiable appetite for tech investments we were bound to see someone game the system. In 2021 VCs were not doing diligence, they were shoving newly raised funds into startups as fast as possible. Venture capital firms invested $643 billion in 2021. Almost double the pace of 2020 and five times as much as was committed in 2012.

For context, noted scam company Theranos raised $1.4 billion over 13 years. FTX raised $1.8 billion in only 3 years.

The entire story of the growth of FTX is a story of the driving forces of tech stock investing being applied to Crypto and fintech. The problem is that when a social media company blows up, users just lose their photos and social graph. When a fintech or Crypto company blows up, customers lose their funds and lives are ruined.

A big part of the problem with FTX was that tech growth hacking and the infinite pot of VC money was applied to financial services with little regard for the safety of users. No one did the diligence. The regulators were asleep at the wheel.

“Grow fast and break things” isn’t an appropriate model for the financial sector.

We Have Questions…

This article mostly dealt with how FTX managed to grow so fast and then blow up so spectacularly but it didn’t touch on the why. As stated in the introduction, there are some major question marks about state entanglement, potential involvement of intelligence operatives and the corruption of captured regulators are all major open questions that I just don’t have answers to.

Was FTX a plant to bring down the Crypto industry and justify tighter regulation?

Was FTX a front for money flowing from Crypto traders and Tech VCs into Democrat coffers?

Why is the mainstream media reporting on this event as if SBF is just a failed entrepreneur who dreamed too big, rather than a fraud who appropriated customer funds?

Who was behind the success of FTX? Who is Gary Wang?

We likely won’t ever get satisfactory answers to these questions. The family political links between major characters in this story are deeply suspicious. As one Crypto Twitter account that has been covering the news relentlessly said:

“This FTX fiasco is *really* doing its best to confirm every single conspiracy theory anyone has ever had about anything.”

Next week in the conclusion of this three part article I’ll cover some of the fallout surrounding the FTX collapse that is important to understand and the lessons being learned by the industry in its attempt to rebuild.

Endnote

[A good place to start down the deep state rabbit hole in all this is Mathew Crawford’s  ‘A Grand Unified Theory of FTX’ – which I printed off to read and it clocks in around 65 pages – markjr]

Today’s post is from contributing analyst Scott Hill. To receive further updates of this series and our overall investment thesis for digital assets (even in this climate), subscribe to the Bombthrower mailing list. 

(Part 1 of 3 special to Bombthrower by digital asset space analyst Scott Hill)

On November 2nd Coindesk published a leaked balance sheet from FTX affiliated market maker Alameda Research.

Ten days later the third largest Crypto exchange in the world was bankrupt and its founder was under international investigation for fraud.

In this article I’ll go through how Crypto giant FTX fell apart. There is a lot of backstory to this situation which I’ll cover in a following article, discussing the beginnings of Alameda research and the story of how a sketchy hedge fund turned into a major exchange.

As you’ve no doubt heard repeatedly this week, self custody of your Crypto is the safest approach until we know who is insolvent and the extent of the contagion. If you’re not confident with self custody, Coinbase and Kraken seem to be the safest Crypto exchanges, but that is still a counterparty risk that I’m not willing to take personally in these market conditions.

The Balance Sheet Leak

The exclusive scoop from Coindesk looked bad for Alameda Research. The firm, which performed market making on FTX as well as taking directional bets and venture capital investments, seemed insolvent on a realized value basis.

Their balance showed $14.6 billion in assets held against $8 billion in liabilities. On paper solvent on a mark-to-market basis, but digging in there was no way that mark was reasonable.

The most egregious example was $5.82 billion worth of FTT tokens on the asset side, around a third locked and the rest unlocked and available to trade. FTT is a token created by FTX, a sort of pseudo-equity token which represented some share of the exchange revenues. Kind of.

FTX had been doing periodic buybacks of the token which were supposed to represent a distribution of exchange revenues to holders. Holding the token also entitled traders to a discount on trading fees. The token was at the time worth around $26. At its peak it was worth around $80.

The main thing that FTT was used for though, was pledging as collateral by FTX and Alameda. 

You read that right, a token which the exchange invented a little over 3 years ago was used as collateral for loans. We know for sure that it was acceptable collateral in various Solana DeFi protocols, which FTX had a significant amount of influence over; but reports are also surfacing that it may have been used to purchase real estate in the Bahamas and quite possibly with various institutional Crypto lending like Genesis which is now facing major problems.

Possibly the most relevant ad you’ll see today…

The problem with FTT

There’s nothing inherently wrong with using Crypto tokens as collateral if there is a robust and deep market pricing them. If the loan goes bad, lenders can seize the collateral and sell it off, covering some of their loss.

FTT didn’t have a deep and robust market.

There was barely any volume. There was barely any liquidity. If a lender had to sell a large volume in a hurry there weren’t any buyers ready to step in.

While Alameda was claiming to have $5.82 billion of its balance sheet held in FTT tokens, the entire available market cap was less than $4 billion.

Read that again, Alameda’s balance sheet held more than the entire market cap of FTT. 

So this wasn’t a situation where a lender might make a loss on selling the collateral, this was a situation where there were potentially billions in loans floating around in the Crypto ecosystem with essentially no collateral that could be liquidated without detonating the market.

Just to top it off, some of this FTT was likely pledged to multiple lenders.

Industry Reaction

The initial reaction was general indifference. Alameda looked like it was playing with fire and had gone all in on the exchange token for its sister company FTX alongside various other FTX supported coins like Solana and Serum. It was an open secret in the industry that Alameda and FTX were more intertwined than they claimed, but if push came to shove it was assumed that Alameda would be allowed to fail and FTX would continue being the highly profitable exchange that everyone assumed it was.

FTX was highly profitable, right?

There were a few that were calling the bluff, but the main gripes were conflict of interest within FTX related companies and unsavory business practices by FTX, trading against customer positions and liquidating accounts improperly. The usual bucket shop tricks. No one seemed to be expecting a total insolvency across the FTX group of companies.

But still something didn’t feel right. Caroline Ellison, the newly appointed CEO of Alameda Research tried to calm fears on Twitter, claiming that the leaked balance sheet was only a partial balance sheet, there were another $10 billion in assets elsewhere within the corporate structure, and they’ve paid down most of their loans.

It was a strange and deeply unsettling response, shrugging the issue off as if the industry should just take her at her word.

Enter the CZ Dragon

Even CZ, the CEO of rival exchange Binance, didn’t seem to be suggesting that FTX was in trouble. Late on Sunday November 6 CZ announced that he would be liquidating the FTT held by Binance.

All $500 million of it.

Binance had been the sole investor in the seed round for FTX.  In 2021 they were bought out for $2.1 billion in cash and FTT tokens. This alone wasn’t enough to push markets into panic. CZ said he would do this over a number of months, carefully and slowly in an attempt to “minimize the market impact”. In a follow up tweet, CZ said that he was doing “post-exit risk management, learning from Luna”

Everyone in Crypto knew what he meant by “learning from Luna”

In May Luna detonated, dropping to zero. The protocol is now seen as a deeply flawed project in the best possible light and a blatant ponzi scheme in the more realistic assessment.

Did CZ, the most powerful man in Crypto just call FTX a ponzi scheme?

Panic

Crypto industry figures were in disbelief. Surely FTX, the darling of the industry, was a highly profitable, solvent and legitimate business. But the reaction was off and deeply troubling. The CEO of Alameda Research quickly asked CZ if she could buy all of the FTT tokens off-market at a price of $22.

The market smelled blood.

Over the course of the next few hours FTT was aggressively shorted, Caroline had put a floor under it at $22 and traders were going to bleed Alameda dry defending that mark. Why did $22 matter? It’s only conjecture, but it seems likely that below $22 Alameda would be liquidated by its lenders and a cascade of FTT tokens would need to be sold into a market unwilling to buy them, flattening the firm.

But traders only thought they were going after Alameda, the predatory market maker.

 In hindsight it’s obvious, you shouldn’t short an exchange token to death on the exchange that issued it, but FTX was the main venue for the fight for $22. A huge amount of volume flowed through the order books and everyone was looking forward to getting paid as the token dropped, first to $18 and later to $6.

While the traders were battling it out, regular users were getting out.

FTX experienced massive outflows and on-chain analysis showed some deeply troubling signs. Alameda was pulling liquidity from everywhere. Every dollar that was deployed in DeFi got pulled. Weird tokens got dumped. But the liquidity wasn’t going into Alameda’s wallet, it was going into FTX wallets to pay customers.

Surely FTX wasn’t funding customer withdrawals from Alameda’s DeFi degen positions?

FTX was supposed to be a full reserve exchange. As an even higher bar, the terms of depositing with FTX were that customers retained title to their assets. Assets were held on trust, they weren’t supposed to be lent out or touched except as directed by the customer.

SBF concedes

On Sunday afternoon, Sam Bankman-Fried (SBF), the CEO of FTX said that the problems with the Alameda balance sheet were just “unfounded rumors”. He explained that FTX had processed billions of dollars in withdrawals and that they would continue to do so. He claimed that they were hitting node capacity, something that I’ve never heard of, and needed to slow down withdrawals.

By Sunday night, withdrawals of some assets had stopped entirely, but there was no announcement from FTX. Radio silence from the team.

We now know that during this period SBF was frantically going to investors to do an emergency fundraise of between $6-10 billion dollars. The terms which later leaked were insane. It was obvious that no lawyer had reviewed these documents.

They seemed to be written by a child, imitating a businessman, who was in way over his head.

Industry insiders at the time thought that FTX had likely lost some amount of user funds, would need to take a loan to cover them and could move on with rebuilding trust. We were shocked to wake up on Tuesday to the news that Binance had made an offer to buy out FTX entirely, subject to due diligence. This isn’t what a rescue package for a competently run business looks like.

This was a fire sale of a dumpster fire.

The previous day SBF had claimed his exchange was fully solvent, just having minor liquidity issues. The next day he was handing the keys to their main rival. Now that balance sheets have been leaked for FTX we know what Binance would have seen as soon as they started their diligence, a balance sheet crammed with dodgy tokens and full of holes, unaudited and put together in excel with no real supporting evidence.

The rumored sale price was one dollar.

CZ quickly walked away from the deal, citing misuse of customer funds and regulatory concerns; leaving SBF to fix his own mess. With the exchange still operational, but withdrawals closed, SBF posted yet another long thread trying to talk his way out of the problem, claiming to be trying to set everything straight and get emergency funding. While he had not yet admitted that it was all over, he did make a bizarre reference to CZ “well played; you won”

As we came to learn later, for this sociopath that’s all it was, just a game to be won or lost.

The Insanity Begins

The rejection of the deal from Binance was the first mention of misuse of customer funds. Until then there was speculation that there was a minor balance sheet hole, remember, no one knew at that time that SBF had been seeking $6-10 billion in emergency funding. The next day the news started pouring in.

Reuters reported that there was a secret back door in the accounting at FTX which allowed customer funds to be moved around without alerting anyone. It also claimed that $10 billion dollars worth of customer funds had been secretly moved to Alameda.

SBF remained silent, but elsewhere there was chaos. Alameda funds were moving around frantically on chain, placing gigantic bets and actively trading.

Was SBF trying to trade out of it?

Tether put a stop to this later in the day, freezing Alameda’s funds on the request of law enforcement.

On the exchange the chaos was even worse. Justin Sun the founder of Tron had shown up to offer to redeem Tron tokens trapped on FTX. Prices spiked as customers flocked to get cents on the dollar via this exit ramp. There was talk of taking complicated cross-platform trades to make a synthetic exit ramp.

The Bahamas Loophole

As the insanity deepened, FTX posted on Twitter that they were processing a small amount of withdrawals to customers in the Bahamas as requested by local authorities. A week later we found out this was a lie, there was no request, but even at the time it seemed likely to be a way for insiders to exit their funds before the inevitable bankruptcy.

Suddenly, traders with stuck funds were desperately trying to obtain a fraudulent Bahamian passport and complete identity checks in the Bahamas. Some even managed to do it apparently and successfully withdrew funds. Black market prices on passports spiked and a secondary market for trapped funds emerged, with accounts trading for 15 cents on the dollar.

NFTs were being traded for entire balances in order to move the funds to an account which could still withdraw.

On the actual exchange things were just as chaotic. Traders with trapped funds were treating their accounts like paper money, trading nonsense on high leverage and dislocating markets. FTX was removed from pricing feeds to restore order elsewhere.

This was the first time in the whole saga that it became clear, it was all over for FTX.

FTX US halts withdrawals

This entire time the story had been that FTX US was a separate entity. Their funds were firewalled off from FTX international. The exchange remained open for withdrawals and appeared to be functioning properly.

This relative calm on the US side of the company instilled some faith. Surely, despite the havoc going on in the Bahamas, the US exchange was well regulated. Surely, the books were audited and no client funds could go missing in the US.

On Thursday afternoon, FTX US halted withdrawals.

Bankruptcy and the Hack

On Friday morning SBF resurfaced and announced that FTX would be put into bankruptcy. The motion was filed in the US and included FTX US. It would later be revealed that SBF had stepped down as CEO and John J Ray III, a lawyer famous for taking over Enron post-collapse, would be similarly guiding FTX through bankruptcy. Everyone breathed a sigh of relief, it was finally done.

But the fun and games weren’t over

Shortly after the bankruptcy was announced funds started moving on-chain. A lot of funds. Over $600 million left FTX affiliated wallets, moving to fresh wallets. The speculation was that there was a hack, perhaps by an insider looking to get the last of what they could out of FTX.

It quickly became clear that there were two teams working. One appeared to have simply moved worthless tokens into storage, a plausible move by a “white hat” or good guy team seeking to preserve user funds from a compromised system.

The other team, the “black hat” team, took the vast majority of the $600 million and moved it all into Ethereum DeFi, trading other coins into Ethereum tokens and consolidating them all together. This consolidation took place across multiple blockchains and traded with reckless abandoning, losing gigantic sums on slippage along the way.

Once the dust had settled, the hacker was one of the largest individual holders of Ethereum.

We don’t quite have the full story on what happened here yet. The Bahamian authorities claim that they seized the assets, with many assuming that they are referring to the hacked funds. It seems far more likely that they are referring to the “white hat” funds only, as the “black hat” funds demonstrated much more sophistication in blockchain use that could be expected of a regulator.

The funds have stopped moving for now. Sitting idle with more that 241,000 ETH, a little less than $300 million worth. No one really knows what will happen with these funds.

Where are we now?

After a week of complete mayhem as the exchange fell apart and another week for the adults to take over and begin the clean up we have two competing bankruptcy procedures. One taking place in the US, overseen by the lawyer who cleaned up after Enron collapsed. The other taking place in the Bahamas, overseen by two accountants from PriceWaterhouseCoopers and a senior local lawyer who has a decades long history of high level appearances in the Supreme Court of the island nation.

It’s not entirely clear which action will take precedence, but they are opposed to each other. The US bankruptcy is seeking that all the companies be wound up together and users are compensated with whatever assets are left across the entire conglomerate.

It turns out, FTX was made up of over 100 individual companies.

The organization chart looks like the web a drunk spider would spin. It’s not the sort of corporate structure that would be constructed for anything other than hiding funds and playing shell games.

The Bahamian action appears to be seeking to have the main FTX company dealt with separately, screwing US customers out of funds and leaving the bankruptcy in the hands of the Bahamian government which seems to have taken some pretty significant donations from FTX in the past.

In filings made late this week FTX was referred to as a “disorganized mess”. There was a lack of proper accounting. The auditing was done by “the first accounting firm in the metaverse” that doesn’t appear to have a physical address. There appears to have been loans made to company executives in the hundreds of millions of dollars range. There was no corporate board. There was no human resources department. There was no accounting department. There was no real tracking of customer funds.

The lawyer handling the FTX bankruptcy also conducted the Enron bankruptcy. He says this is far worse.

Enough for now

This is just the walkthrough of how everything fell apart in front of our eyes. The corruption, the lies and the scandal have all been uncovered in the wake of this collapse. In another article coming shortly I will cover the rise and fall of FTX and Alameda Research, delving into the backstory that allowed this fraud to grow under the cover of one of the most well regarded companies in the industry.

Today’s post is from contributing analyst Scott Hill. To receive further updates of this series and our overall investment thesis for digital assets (even in this climate), subscribe to the Bombthrower mailing list. 

“This gamble came undone due to the dumping of millions of dollars in copper into the market to stop a hostile takeover in an unrelated organization.”

Panic Is The Way Of Maintaining Power

Guest post by Kane McGukin, who publishes The Mesh Point Substack

The history of money and high finance is long and storied. It’s a world of economic systems and corporations built to frothy heights only to come crashing down at rather obvious but “unexpected” moments.

If you dig in. If you follow the money trail over hundreds of years and across various similar but different economic schemes and monetary systems. You will find that money leads to greed > greed leads to leverage > and leverage leads to an eventual liquidity crisis. These are the events that bring financial systems crashing down.

You might be surprised at first. But, after a deeper review, you’ll begin to notice a pattern. While dates change, names change, and asset bubbles change. Liquidity crises are always much the same.

There’s nothing new under the sun.

The opening quote is about the Knickerbocker Trust Company which was the match that ignited the fire causing the Panic of 1907

The Problem With Man is Money And The Problem With Money Is Man

In light of the collapse of Voyager, Celsius, 3 Arrows, BlockFi and now their savior FTX, the opening quote says it all. Over the last few days, as collateral has unwound, no asset, firm, or protocol has been left unscathed. Not even bitcoin.

Because a liquidity crisis is a liquidity crisis and they all rhyme. They all march to a similar beat.

If we change just a word here or there, the tune is quite clear. For instance, in the opening quote, if we change “copper” to “FTT Tokens” we move from 1907 to 2022.

This gamble came undone due to the dumping of millions of dollars of FTT Tokens into the market to stop a hostile takeover in an unrelated organization.

“Just ten years before the crisis, the bank grew from $10 million in deposits to $61 million. The failure of such a prestigious financial institution inevitably caused the jitters to spread throughout the banking system.” ~FinNotes

In a nutshell, this is the battle we’ve seen between Sam Bankman-Fried of FTX and Changpeng Zhao of Binance. A battle that brought down the house and sent fear throughout the Crypto market and brought likely large losses to a number of TradFi backers.

In crisis moments liquidity seizes until the dust settles and new players step in. It is crisis moments that usually reset the rules. They redefine the players, move the stacks, and start the game board anew. That’s why the characteristics of a liquidity crunch are repetitive in nature. In a roundabout way, once you’ve seen one, you’ve seen them all.

Two big lessons:

1: Never use a token you created as collateral.

2: Don’t borrow if you run a crypto business. Don’t use capital “efficiently”. Have a large reserve.

Binance has never used BNB for collateral, and we have never taken on debt.

Stay #SAFU.

— CZ Binance (@cz_binance) November 8, 2022

Financial calamity is nothing new. At many different points in history, man has developed new monetary technologies that drive society forward. With one caveat. We’ve been unable to do so without avoiding greed, liquidity crunches, and panics.

Whether it’s Alexander Hamilton’s construction of the US financial system post-Revolutionary War, Wildcat Banking, The Panic of 1907, The Great Depression, The Savings and Loan Crisis, The Asian Currency Crisis, The 2000 Crash, or The Great Recession in 2008 all of these panics and crisis look much the same.

Thanks for reading The Mesh Point! Subscribe for free

You can change the names of the people and the times of the events but the playbook for orchestration is well documented.

It starts with an area that is lightly regulated to completely unregulated. The market gets cornered by knowledgeable players who pump growth in an exponential manner. The grifters make handsome profits. An attraction that brings more. Greed gets out of control just as collateral dries up and buyers are margined beyond a point of no return. Once the last buyer buys, the music stops, and a collapse begins to feed on itself.

It’s a story told many times over the last few hundred years in financial markets. One that has played out again with the collapse of FTX and others in crypto, in 2022.

There’s euphoria in the air. A new financial system means creating a new set of financial rails. Bringing on a new set of elites who will challenge the old political guard. As a new monetary medium flows through the system we see a girth of new interest and bubbles begin to form. There’s an encouragement of leverage, a yearning for greed that ultimately leads to challenging the old guard and its rules. Bitcoin and the cryptocurrency ecosystem are no different as we’ve seen these characteristics rear their ugly head over the last couple of years.

What starts as a mockery quickly becomes a battle. The unlikely becomes a formidable challenger as incubation happens in unregulated markets. Often, this new upstart musters a challenge by providing for those that have been left to the wayside by staunch, unhelpful policies that are antiquated in their ability to fill the needs of the people of the new day and age.

“The failure of the Knickerbocker Trust Company was but the beginning, not the end, of a panic that would engulf a turbulent and rapidly growing nation as it entered the twentieth century.” ~ Panic of 1907

“Given the fundamental factors in place that should support the demand for housing, we believe the effect of the troubles in the subprime sector on the broader housing market will likely be limited.” ~ Ben Bernanke,2007

“When the tape falls behind for ten minutes or half an hour the Exchange and its doings drop, as it were, behind a cloud. As a result the humble ticker—which everyone has taken for granted up to now—has suddenly become the big problem of the stock market.” ~ Collier’s /Unknown, 1928

These panics while monetary in nature, are manmade and handcrafted underneath the surface. As laid out inTragedy and Hope, The Secrets of The Federal Reserve, Lords of Finance, The Creature From Jekyll Island, and a vast array of other historical books and officially documented accounts.

Experience is all you need. To become well versed in one. In a roundabout way, it makes you well versed in all.

Whether it’s the behind-closed-door meetings of 2008 to decide the winners (JP Morgan) and losers (Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers) in order to reshape Wall Street. Or, it’s the iron-fisted and locked door meetings of 1907 held by John Pierpont Morgan himself. They’re not too dissimilar to an SBF / CZ twitter agreement of 2022.

In each crisis, the goals are clear and the same. Shuffle the deck. Maintain power. Restart the music. But, leave the control in the hands of an inner circle.

“Brokerage firms, which handled stock market transactions, were also in danger of failing. They were paying skyrocketing interest rates on loans to meet their obligations. Morgan put together a $25 million “money pool” for making lower interest loans to them, avoiding an almost certain stock market crash. But the largest brokerage firm on Wall Street, Moore & Schley, was $25 million in debt. The bankruptcy of this key firm could still set off a stock market crash. Morgan called a meeting at the Morgan Library. He assembled the city’s commercial and trust company bankers, put them in separate rooms, locked the front door, and kept the key in his pocket until he could negotiate a deal. The meeting went well into the night. Trust company bankers resisted pooling their reserves to stop the panic, but negotiations wore on. At 4:30 a.m., Morgan finally bullied them into signing an agreement. It called for the trust company bankers to bail out their brother bankers who were struggling with runs on their deposits. For his part, Morgan promised to save the Moore & Schley brokerage.” –JP Morgan, The Panic of 1907, & The Federal Reserve Act

Panics do happen because of frothy and lax financial interest.

However, if you go down the rabbit hole, you’ll find they are less about the banks and more intentional snares to push or maintain power and control. As in the case of 1907, a panic was created as a means to justify a Federal Reserve Bank (1913) that otherwise would not be accepted by the people. More specifically, not a bank in the states that were to be directed from afar.

While the US was set up as a free country,Alexander Hamilton, adopted the banking practices of England and over the first hundred or so years we gave back the power through an interconnected web of JP Morgan,Paul Warburg’s Federal Reserve,Kuhn, Loeb & Co.(Lehman Brothers) and the building out of an industrial society and media conglomerates who served propaganda for those near but were controlled from afar. In that regard, we broke free but maintained a direct tie to the hand of the Rothschild’s who have been said to control a global banking cartel since the mid to late 1700s.

Panic Is The Way Of Maintaining Power

Today, on the time chain of history, we find ourselves sitting on a dot rife with chaos and conflict. Whether it’s broken money, crises, political bickering, or geopolitical monetary and cyber battles. We find ourselves in a world of eroding values and one of broken money.

The propaganda blares from both sides and hops from one country to the next. Distorting the focus of not one, but all. This is not by accident. It’s the classic story of good vs. evil.

A story that started with Adam and Eve and morphed into the Rothschildian Formula for banking success. Articulate ways, not by accident but by design. Created to muster chaos… on all sides, so that those in the middle stand ready to profit regardless of the outcome.

And now we know why the failure of Lehman Brother’s was such a big deal.

Not because it was a globally systemic important bank.

But rather, it was THE gsib. Leaving primarily only JPM as a conduit for agendas. pic.twitter.com/C7jJW0uoKq

— BitKane (@kanemcgukin) November 7, 2022

The Rothschild Formula is nothing more than market-making. Making markets on a global scale. Markets that create war. Markets that create chaos. Markets devoid of peace. Because one takes no allegiance, funds both sides to create demand that drives a liquidity crunch such that capital centralizes itself back into their hands. Into the hands of the cartel.

After much gathering, it’s my opinion that at the top, sits the Rothschild Formula. Pushed out to the world by policies and practices set by the Bank For International Settlements (BIS).

Policy is then carried out by the IMF, World Bank, and World Economic Forum. Those orders are passed to the Federal Reserve whose NYFRB desk executes the orders into the markets causing all other global central banks to react. Either in unison or against the grain. It all depends on their individual tolerance for their people’s pain.

That’s what we’ve seen throughout man’s monetary history. The last few years are no different. Geopolitical clashes have formed and are spilling over into financial markets at the same time as a new financial system and rails are being constructed. The battle is on many fronts. Both political and financial. New rules are being set.

Rules that bring success and give power because that’s what liquidity crises do. They shuffle the deckchairs, consolidate power and centralized control into the hands of a few.

Control the money, control the people. Break the money, break the people.

Fix the money… Fix the world.

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